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represents a re-timing of benefit payments. Nevertheless, many people view the benefit reduction as a tax on
earned income after claiming benefits. We posit that whether the Earnings Test influences work and benefit
claiming patterns will depend on whether people are aware of the benefit enhancements paid in return for
continued work. Using an experimental module of the RAND American Life Panel, we explore how people
perceive the Social Security Earnings Test and examine alternative ways to frame the tradeoff between
reduced benefits in the short run and higher benefits paid later and for life. Our overall finding is that
knowledge of the Earnings Test is uneven, with better educated, higher earning, older individuals showing
somewhat greater knowledge than others. The frames we have tested produce only minor effects on individual
choices of earnings or claiming ages, and the effects are difficult to reconcile with economic theory.
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Framing the Social Security Earnings Test
Jeffrey R. Brown, Arie Kapteyn, Olivia S. Mitchell, and Teryn Mattox

Under the Social Security “Earnings Test,” when an individual claims his Social Security
benefits prior to his Full Retirement Age (currently age 66) and then returns to work, his benefit
check will be reduced by 50 cents per dollar earned over a relatively low annual dollar threshold.
Offsets of this sort have been in force since the inception of the US Social Security system
(DeWitt, 1999), and they are prevalent in US corporate pension plans as well as internationally.1
In this paper, we first confirm the findings of Liebman and Luttmer (2011, 2012) that many
people do not realize that this reduction in benefits for people younger than their Full Retirement
Age is repaid in full later, in the form of higher benefits for life. Then we explore whether
alternative ways of framing, or describing, the Earnings Test might serve to change peoples’
work patterns at older ages.
The Social Security Earnings Test has been in place virtually since the system’s
inception, implemented by those who argued that benefits should be used as income replacement
vehicle for those too frail to work. Others saw the Test as a tactic to induce older workers to
leave the job market, thus “mak(ing) way for younger workers.” 2 The “lump of labor” fallacy
has now been discredited,3 and today’s Social Security system faces deep financial stringencies.

1

For instance, Baker and Benjamin (1999) examine Canada’s Retirement Test; Kirkpatrick (1974)
examined similar rules across one hundred different countries.
2
DeWitt (1999: np) citing testimony of the Honorable John J. Rhodes, III, in hearings before the House
Ways & Means Subcommittee on Social Security, 1991. He also stated that “[s]ome have contended that
the Social Security Earnings Test was initially conceived as a means to ensure that program beneficiaries
had withdrawn “from gainful employment as a condition of benefit receipt. For wage earners, this
requirement was and is measured primarily by a test of earnings levels… [the earnings test] is simply the
administrative form of the principle that one must be retired in order to collect retirement benefits from
Social Security's old-age insurance program.”
3
For a discussion see Gruber and Wise (2010).

2

For this reason, a number of researchers have suggested that the U.S. may wish to look for ways
of encouraging individuals to stay in the work force for longer and to delay claiming Social
Security benefits (e.g., Shoven and Slavov 2012; Social Security Advisory Board 2008; Butrica,
Smith, and Steuerle 2006). Additionally, those seeking to implement feasible Social Security
reforms might benefit from knowing whether the Earnings Test might reasonably be changed to
encourage continued work.
Numerous prior empirical studies have asked whether and how the Earnings Test in the
United States influenced retirement patterns, and it has proven to be a complex topic to analyze.
The Earnings Test has been a moving target, changing in important ways over time (c.f. Myers,
1954). In the original 1935 legislation, for instance, a retiree’s benefits were to be cut to zero if
he earned a single dollar. This provision was changed before the first benefit checks were issued,
however: effective in 1940, claimants were permitted to earn up to $14.99 per month without
losing benefits, and the earnings threshold was thereafter raised periodically over the years (see
below). From 1961 onward, the benefit offset rate for earnings was periodically reduced,
enabling older claimants to earn additional amounts over the threshold without losing all
benefits. And in 1972, the Delayed Retirement Credit was introduced, which raised benefits for
workers who deferred retirement beyond their Full Retirement Age. The actuarial adjustment
has also changed (see Table 1).
Table 1 here
As a consequence of these rule changes, the Earnings Test today no longer has the same
economic implications as in the past. Since 2000, the actuarial adjustments have been set so that
it is not, on average, a tax. This is because benefits are reduced if an early retiree earns more than
the $14,640 threshold per year, but this reduction in benefits for ages 62-65 is then repaid in the

3

form of higher benefits for life, once the retiree attains the Full Retirement Age. Moreover, this
additional benefit is at least actuarially fair (and may even be advantageous in an environment of
low interest rates).4 In 2012, for instance, a beneficiary younger than the Full Retirement Age
(age 66) loses 50 cents per dollar earned over the threshold, which is later offset by a higher
benefit paid from age 66 onward. This additional amount will, on average, provide him with the
same total expected lifetime benefits from Social Security.5 Accordingly, in this sense, the
Earnings Test is actually not a tax but rather simply a re-timing of the flow of future Social
Security benefits.
Nevertheless, there is widespread misunderstanding about the way the Earnings Test
rules work.6 In what follows, we seek to evaluate using the American Life Panel whether
alternative presentations of the Earnings Test and benefit consequences might improve
participant understanding of how the rules work. We also examine whether alternative fames
might alter peoples’ anticipated work and earnings plans. In doing so, we address two specific
questions: (1) How do people currently perceive the Earnings Test and how does this shape their
current expectations around claiming age and retirement age?, and (2) How do alternative frames
or presentations about the Earnings Test shape understanding and expected work behavior? In
doing so, we build on our earlier work where we showed that different ways of presenting Social

4

As the Social Security Administration notes on its website (SSA 2012b): “You can get Social Security retirement or
survivors benefits and work at the same time. But, if you are younger than full retirement age and earn more than
certain amounts, your benefits will be reduced. It is important to note, though, that these benefit reductions are not
truly lost. Your benefit will be increased at your full retirement age to account for benefits withheld due to earlier
earnings.” Munnell and Sass (2012) even argue that the benefit increase is better than actuarially fair in times such
as the present with very low interest rates; see also Shoven and Slavov (2012).
5
A higher exempt amount applies only to the year in which someone attains his Full Retirement Age. In 2012, for
instance the exempt amount for that year only is $38,880 a year and the Earnings Test is 33% per dollar above that
threshold. See http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/rtea.html
6
For instance a recent news article described how some people contemplate working post-age 62: “Attorney Jim
Antoniono, 66, of Greensburg, began collecting Social Security benefits this year at full retirement age. ‘I didn't
look at it earlier because I knew there was a penalty (loss of benefits) if you continued to work,’ he said. ‘It just
didn't make sense.’" (Duncan, 2012: np). See also Liebman and Luttmer (2012), and Greenwald et al. (2010a and b).

4

Security benefit flows produced economically meaningful and statistically significant changes in
outcomes (Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2012).
Our survey confirms that there is widespread misunderstanding of the impact of work on
Social Security benefits prior to the Full Retirement Age. To the extent that people inaccurately
perceive the ET as a tax, they may be less likely to keep working after they are eligible for
reduced benefits, a fact that has implications for their economic well-being at older ages. Yet our
exploration of different ways to present the Earnings Test shows minor and inconsistent effects
on both claiming ages and anticipated earnings between 62 and the FRA. Our overall conclusion
– albeit one that should be further explored via additional research - is that the mechanics of the
Earnings Test are sufficiently obscure to most people that they are likely to have great difficulty
deciding what is in their best interest.
In what follows, we first document what people believe about the Social Security
Earnings Test and offer some suggestions as to why this topic engenders so much perplexity
among the public. We also briefly review prior studies of the empirical impact of changes in the
Earnings Test on retirement behavior, many of which conclude that people act as though benefits
are cut permanently by working during the period prior to the Full Retirement Age. Next we
describe our methodology and data which are taken from a survey of respondents to the
American Life Panel. After asking respondents about their understanding of the Earnings Test
using a vignette about a hypothetical worker, we explain the Test using several alternative ways
of presenting the rules. Having previously been asked to select a claiming age and a likely
pattern of labor earnings, the respondents are then invited to alter these outcomes after the frame
presentations. After summarizing results, we offer conclusions.

5

1. Perceptions of the Social Security Earnings Test
The rules under which workers’ earnings have been “tested” to determine whether they
are truly retired for the purposes of Social Security benefit receipt have varied a great deal over
time. Under the original Social Security Act of 1935, all benefits were to be withdrawn if the
beneficiary earned a single dollar. The rationale was that “one must retire in order to receive a
retirement benefit because loss of earnings due to retirement is the insured condition” (DeWitt
1997: np). In 1940, this was changed to be an effective 100% tax on earnings over a small
threshold (initially set at $14.99 per month). The policy was further relaxed beginning in 1939
when claimants were permitted to keep a portion of their benefits over the threshold (although a
100% tax still applied above a higher threshold). Beginning in 1960, the 100% offset was
changed to no offset up to $1,200/year, 50% benefit reduction rate between $1200 and $1500,
and full reduction for earnings over that amount. The 100% earnings tax rate was eliminated in
1972. That was also the year that Congress introduced the Delayed Retirement Credit, which
boosted benefits by 1% per year for someone who claimed his benefits later than his Full
Retirement Age. In 1977, a lower ET threshold was applied to those working at ages 62-64,
compared to those age 65+; that same year, legislation raised the Delayed Retirement Credit to
3% per year. In 1983 the Earnings Test was eliminated for claimants who worked beyond age 70,
and the Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act of 2000 abolished the Social Security Earnings
Test for workers attaining their Full Retirement Age. The Earnings Test for younger
beneficiaries (prior to the FRA) remains in place (Nuschler and Shelton, 2010).

6

Probably because there have been so many changes in the Earnings Test rules over time,
it stands to reason that some (and perhaps many) people would fail to understand how the policy
works. For instance, Packard (1990: 8) speculated that:
“(I)f the benefit adjustment for delaying the receipt of benefits or for losing
benefits because of the test were actuarially fair … these provisions would offset
the entire work disincentive effect. Unfortunately, the effects of these provisions
would be behaviorally significant only if they were fully understood by the
beneficiary population. Little indication exits that the beneficiary population is
aware of the potential effects of either provision.”
Biggs (2008:1) argued as follows:
“Most retirees are unaware of this because the Social Security Administration
(SSA) and financial advisers fail to inform them of how the earnings test works.
Retirees need better information—and policymakers should consider whether the
earnings test makes sense at all… Until very recently, SSA’s own publications on
the earnings test did not provide details on the benefit adjustment that takes place
at the full retirement age. As a result, many retirees work less at the very time
when continued work could benefit them most.”
Interestingly, several economic studies have found that older Americans’ work and
earnings patterns have responded to changes in the Earnings Test over time, with varying
estimates regarding the size of the Test’s disincentive effects on work.7 Nevertheless, most of
these analyses focus only on the benefit reduction due to earning over the threshold, and they
have generally ignored the fact that benefits rise later after people attain the Full Retirement
Age.8 For instance, Friedberg and Webb (2009: 10) propose that “beneficiaries appear to react to
the earnings test…because the credits are not well understood despite actuarially fair
adjustments.” Likewise Gelber et al. (2011: np) recognize that the increase in benefits from the
7

A partial list of a very long set of references includes for instance Baker and Benjamin (1999), Behaghel
and Blau (2010), Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2007, 2008), Burtless and Moffitt (1985), Coile et al. (2002),
Engelhardt and Kumar. (2009), Friedberg (2000), Friedberg and Webb (2009), Gelber, Damon and Sacks
(forthcoming), Gruber and Orszag (1999, 2003), Gustman and Steinmeier (2004, 2012), Haider and
Loughran (2008), Honig and Reimers (1989), Leibman and Luttmer (2012), Leonesio (1990), Michaud
and Van Soest (2007), Packard (1990), Reimbers and Honig (1993, 1996), Sander (1968), Song (2003),
and Song and Manchester (2007a and b) among others.
8
An exception is Michaud and van Soest (2007).
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FRA for those who were subject to the Earnings Test is “approximately actuarially fair….This is
probably important, but we largely ignore it.” In other words, many analysts assume that the
Earnings Test is a disincentive to claim benefits by older individuals contemplating continuing to
work.
Brown and Perron (2011:2) suggested that most respondents are “aware that the earnings
test can reduce current benefits for workers younger than full retirement age, (but) most
incorrectly believe that the result is a permanent reduction in benefits.” Liebman and Luttmer
(2008, 2011) conducted two surveys a year apart to a sample of workers age 60-65: they showed
that around three-fifths (56% in the earlier and 62% in the later study) of the respondents knew
that benefits in payment status would be reduced if the individual earned more than a threshold
amount. Yet only two-fifths of this subsample in the later year was aware that the benefit
reduction would later be offset by higher benefits, meaning that fewer than one in four overall
(39% of 62%, or 24%) knew that the Earnings Test actually did not entail a lifetime benefit
reduction. For those who understood that benefits would later rise, the median anticipated benefit
increase was 5-6.25% per year of delay up to age 70, versus the actual rate of increase of 6-8%.
Interestingly, among those at least somewhat aware of the Earnings Test in 2008, the median
reported level of threshold earnings was quite close to the actual value ($12,000 at age 64, versus
the actual value of $13,560 in 2008). Overall, however, the authors concluded that “people
appear to have little awareness of the provision that benefits received after the full-benefit age
will be increased to roughly compensate for the benefits lost due to the earnings test” (Liebman
and Luttmer 2008: 19).9

9

They also conducted a field experiment in which a treatment group received information about Social
Security rule including the earnings test, and a control group which did not receive these data. A year
later, a follow-up survey was carried out, and few more (28%) of the treatment group receiving additional

8

One reason that few workers might understand how the Earnings Test works is that it is
frequently overlooked by financial advisers. For instance, a website offering advice to senior
citizens (Proseniors.com 2012) accurately states how the Test works, but it is silent on how
benefits are boosted on reaching the Full Retirement Age:
What Happens If I Work While Receiving Social Security Benefits? Social
Security withholds benefits if your earnings exceed a certain level but only if
you are under your FRA. If you retire in 2010 between the ages of 62 and
your FRA and earn more than $14,160, your SS benefit is reduced by $1 for
each $2 earned that exceeds $14,160.
A similar bias is inherent in other advisory websites (e.g. MyRetirementPaycheck.com 2012).
And even when the benefits adjustment is described, frequently it is presented as a risky gamble
(Kaplan 2008:38): “the early retirement penalty…incurred by electing to receive Social Security
retirement benefits before the…full retirement age will be recalculated [at]…that age to reflect
the loss of benefits…suffered this year.…But that adjustment is small consolation in the current
year, and its salutary effect is entirely contingent on…future longevity. In brief, the operation of
the retirement earnings test acts as a major economic disincentive to take Social Security benefits
and engage in any remunerative activity beyond a very low level until the claimant reaches his or
her full retirement age.”10 The Social Security’s website (SSA, 2012) does a reasonable job of
explaining how the Earnings Test is offset by higher benefits at present, but Biggs (2008:1) notes
that “[u]ntil very recently, SSA’s own publications on the earnings test did not provide details on
the benefit adjustment that takes place at the full retirement age. As a result, many retirees work
less at the very time when continued work could benefit them most.”

information were aware of the later benefit enhancement, but the effect was not statistically significant at
conventional levels (5% or better).
10
This is similar to the “breakeven” framework for evaluating delayed benefit claiming; Brown, Kapteyn
and Mitchell (2012) report that such an approach significantly encourages early claiming behavior.

9

Accordingly, while it is widely believed that people simply do not understand the
Earnings Test and the subsequent benefit enhancement post-FRA, it remains to be seen what can
be done about it. In what follows, we first investigate further whether and which kinds of people
are least well informed about the Social Security Earnings Test. We also seek to evaluate which
particular sorts of presentations might be most effective in establishing if, indeed, the lack of
information is widespread, and (b) clarifying that “[t]he key point is that any reduction in
benefits under the earnings test triggers a subsequent increase in benefits” (Gruber and Orszag
1999: 9). To this we turn next.

2. Methodology and Data
We assess the impact of different ways to frame this decision using an experimental
module we designed for the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). This is an online panel of U.S.
households that regularly take surveys over the Internet. If, at the recruiting stage, households
lack internet access, they are provided laptops or WebTV by RAND. In this way, the ALP has
the advantage relative to most other Internet panels not requiring Internet access in the recruiting
stage.11
The American Life Panel included around 4,924 active panel members at the time we
contacted participants age 18 or older to invite them to take our survey. We fielded our module
in the first quarter of 2012, and 3,736 panel members completed the survey for a response rate of
76% (see Table 2). We dropped 86 respondents who participated in the pilot before the main
survey was conducted, 46 respondents who did not complete the module, and one respondent
who reported an (implausible) income of $400 billion. Depending on the specific analysis, we
omitted respondents who were age 62+, disabled, not US residents, and who gave an initial claim
11

For more explanation of the ALP see http://www.rand.org/pubs/corporate_pubs/CP508-2005-11.html.
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age over the Full Retirement Age or for whom no estimated benefit could be calculated (mostly
because they were too young to have a sufficient earnings record). If residents indicated they did
not believe they would be eligible to receive Social Security benefits either on their own earnings
record or that of a current, late, or former spouse, they were asked to assume for the purposes of
the survey that they would receive Social Security benefits equal to the average received by
people with their average age/education/sex characteristics.
Table 2 here

Eliciting Knowledge of the Earnings Test
To ascertain peoples’ level of knowledge about the Social Security Earnings Test, we
asked them to first answer a series of questions by means of a vignette about a hypothetical
worker named Joe (specific wording given below). The idea was to solicit answers to questions
about the impact of returning to work after claiming benefits.12 For all of the questions, the order
of the answers was randomized to mitigate the types of framing found in other surveys (Brown et
al. 2012). If the respondent correctly perceived that benefits would be reduced for someone
earning $20,000 after claiming at age 62, we then asked the following:
The Joe Vignette
12.) Now, suppose that on his 63rd birthday – one year after Joe first stopped working and claimed Social Security
benefits – Joe goes back to work part-time. In that year, he earns $20,000. We now want to ask you some
questions about how you think Joe’s decision to go back to work might affect his Social Security benefits at
different ages. Let’s start with the year Joe is age 63 and works part-time for $20,000. While he is working that
year, what do you think would happen to his Social Security benefits for that year?
a. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be unchanged. In other words, Joe would still receive the
same $1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work.
b. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be reduced. In other words, Joe would receive less than the
$1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work. [RIGHT ANSWER]

12

Brown and Perron (2011) presented a simpler vignette to a sample of around 3,000 persons age 55-66
either currently receiving or expecting to receive Social Security benefits in the future. They report that
most (80%) of this age group knew that working and earning $40,000 per year would reduce benefits for
someone working at age 63, but the majority (60%) believed the reduction would be permanent.

11

c. His monthly benefits during this year (age 63) would be increased. In other words, Joe would receive more than
the $1,000 per month that he would have received had he not returned to work.

This leads to a branchpoint. Accordingly if the respondent indicated that answer (a) was correct
for question 12 (‘unchanged’), we asked:
15) In the last question, you told us that Joe would get the same amount of benefits at age 63 even if he returned to
work that year. Is there any amount he could earn that year that would reduce his benefits?
a. Yes, if he earned more than a certain amount, his benefits would be reduced. [RIGHT ANSWER IF BELIEVE
THRESHHOLD IS HIGHER]
b. No, Social Security benefits would not be withheld, no matter how much he earned while age 64.

If he responded (a) to question 15 (yes), we next asked:
16) What do you think is the maximum he could earn without having his benefits reduced ? (Give us your best
guess, even if you don’t know the exact amount) He could earn up to [FILL IN] dollars per year while age 64
without having Social Security benefits withheld. If he earned more than that, he would have benefits withheld due
to returning to work. [RIGHT ANSWER IF BELIEVE THRESHHOLD IS HIGHER THAN $20,000 SHOULD BE
OVER THAT LIMIT]

If the respondent indicated that answer (b) was correct for question 12 (‘reduced’), then we
asked:
13) In the last question, you told us that Joe’s benefits at age 63 would be reduced because he returned to work that
year. Is there any amount that Joe could earn during the year that he is 63 without reducing his Social Security
benefits in that year?
a. Yes [RIGHT ANSWER]
b. No, the Social Security benefits he will be entitled to for that year will be reduced no matter how much he earned
that year.

If he responded (a) to question 13 then we asked:
14) You just told us that there is some amount that a person can earn without reducing the Social Security benefits
he is entitled to for that year. What is this amount? (Give us your best guess, even if you don’t know the exact
amount) Once he earns more than roughly [FILL IN] dollars per year at age 64, Social Security benefit payments
will be reduced. [RIGHT ANSWER IS $14,640, ANY ANSWER from $10,000 to $20,000 MARKED AS
CORRECT.]

Everyone was then asked the following question which sought to get at the issue of whether
Joe’s benefit would be lower after he stopped working:

17). Now let’s imagine that at the end of that year, right before his 64th birthday, Joe stops working again and never
again returns to work. Let’s consider what happens to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 64, right after he stopped
working permanently, as a result of the fact that he went back to work for one year while he was age 63.
a. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be unchanged. In other words, Joe would still receive the same $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. [RIGHT ANSWER]
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b. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be reduced. In other words, Joe would receive less than the $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.
c. His monthly benefits at age 64 would be increased. In other words, Joe would receive more than the $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.

Everyone also got the next question, which finally gets directly at whether the respondent knew
that benefits after the full retirement age would rise due to the Earnings Test:

18). Now let’s consider what would happen to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 68, several years after he
stopped working permanently. We would like to know what you believe would happen to Joe’s benefits as a result
of the fact that he went back to work for a single year while he was age 63. Recall that age 68 is older than the
Social Security full retirement age.
a. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be unchanged. In other words, Joe would still receive the same $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.
b. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be reduced. In other words, Joe would receive less than the $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work.
c. His monthly benefits at age 68 would be increased. In other words, Joe would receive more than the $1,000 per
month that he would have received had he not returned to work. [RIGHT ANSWER]

Finally, if the respondent knew that benefits would rise as of the normal retirement age we
asked:

19. You answered that, as a result of his part-time work while he was age 63, Joe’s Social Security benefit would
grow to more than $1,000 at age 64 and also at age 68. We would now like to know how you think the Social
Security benefit paid while he is age 68 compares to what he received at age 65. Based on what we have told you
(and remembering that we are assuming there is no inflation and no cost-of-living increases), do you think that the
Social Security benefit he is paid while age 68 would be:
a. Less than the benefit paid while he is age 65
b. The same as the benefit paid while he is age 65
c. Greater than the benefit paid while he is age 65 [RIGHT ANSWER]

Figure 1 illustrates how the Joe vignette appeared on the respondents’ screens.
Figure 1 here

The Earnings Test Frames
So as to gauge respondents’ knowledge by means of the hypothetical “Joe” questions, we
next present respondents with several different frames that seek to assess how respondents think
about how the Test affects earnings between the early claiming date and FRA, as well as on
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benefit amounts after the FRA. So as to be able to measure these effects, we first ask respondents
age 62 or younger early in the survey what age they expect to claim Social Security benefits. We
also asked each person what he expected to earn per year between ages 62-70, as follows:
10) At each of the following ages, about how much do you expect to earn from working each year? If you are not
sure, enter your best guess. [Don’t include income from any sources other than working, such as investment income,
Social Security or pension benefits, or alimony. Also exclude income earned outside of the US.]
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
Age
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
Earnings

After completing the Joe vignette, each respondent is reminded of his answer to the earlier
claiming question as follows:
20) Now we are going to ask the same question again, with different assumptions. Please read the question carefully.
At the beginning of this survey, you told us that you expect to claim Social Security benefits at age [INSERT
CLAIM AGE]. You also told us that you expect to have the following earnings from age 62 through 67.
Age 62

Age 63

Age 64

Age 65

Age 66

Age 67

Age 68

Age 69

Age 70

$20000

$20000

$20000

$20000

$20000

$0

$0

$0

$0

Earnings

Subsequently, respondents are shown several different frames explaining how the Earnings Test
works. We describe these consecutively:
FRAME 1: Assume no Earnings Test
For purposes of this question, please assume that if you continue to work after claiming Social Security benefits, your benefits
would not be affected now or in the future. Assuming this, would you change your date of claiming and/or your actual or
expected earnings between ages 62 and 70?
a. Yes
b. No

If the respondent answers ‘Yes’ to this question, he is then shown a screen where he can change
his answer if desired. Figure 2 shows the screen replaying the respondent’s original answer (and
the question if the respondent wants to stick to the earlier choice), and a second screen where the
respondent can make changes as a result of the new information. The claiming age is displayed
by moving the slider, while earnings can be adjusted by entering new amounts into the table.
Figure 2 here
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FRAME 2: Assume it is a tax
The first part of the question is identical to the previous frame, but then it makes the following assumption about the
ET. Now assume that if you claimed your Social Security benefits before [INSERT FRA] and earned more than a
particular amount in any year before [INSERT FRA], your benefits due to returning to work will be lowered by 50
cents for each dollar that you earn over this amount. This is called the “Social Security earnings test.” Assuming
this, would you change your date of claiming and/or your actual or expected earnings between ages 62 and 70?
a. Yes
b. No

If the respondent answers ‘Yes,’ the same screen as shown in Figure 2A is shown. Figure 2B
shows screen shots of both the initial question and of the screen where the respondent can change
her original answer.
Figure 3 then shows a screen shot where the respondent can change answers; the question
is as follows:
FRAME 3: Provide correct information about the ET; verbal only
The “earnings test” we just described is applied to earnings before age [INSERT FRA]. It is important to note,
however, that these benefit reductions are not truly lost. Your Social Security benefit is increased as of [INSERT
FRA] to make up for benefits withheld due to earlier earnings.

Next, respondents are shown one more frame, this time selected at random from five different
frames, described next. The screen now displays how benefits rise after the Full Retirement Age.
For instance, in Figure 4, if the respondent clicks ‘yes,’ he sees a new screen also shown in
Figure 4. By moving the slider and by changing the earnings numbers, he can see how benefits
are affected.
Figures 3 and 4 here
Compared to the amounts of money “taxed away” by the ET, the increase in benefits after
FRA may look small. For this reason we also devise a frame where the increase in benefits is
presented as a lump sum (Figure 5). Once again, if the respondent says ‘Yes,’ he is shown a
screen with a slider depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5 here
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Next we combine the previous two frames. Figure 6 shows the effect of the earnings test
on both the monthly benefits after FRA and also the lump sum equivalent. Once again, if the
respondent responds that he wishes to change his initial choice, a new screen opens up with a
slider offering the chance alter the claiming age and/or change earnings levels before the FRA.
These changes will influence the value of benefits given up before FRA and the effects on
monthly benefits and the equivalent lump sum after FRA.
Figure 6 here
Finally, some respondents are presented with Frames 4d and 4e, which are similar to 4b
and 4c but they embody different assumptions about the interest rates used to compensate for the
increase in benefits needed to compensate for the loss of benefits between early and full
retirement age. The Social Security Administration uses a discount rate of 2.9%, whereas the rate
that would be required to make the tradeoff actuarially fair depends on the respondent’s claiming
age/birth year.

3. Results for Joe Vignette
Next we use the knowledge questions derived using the Joe vignette to cluster
respondents in terms of their knowledge of the impact of additional work on benefits both before
and after the Full Retirement Age. Results in Table 3 confirm that only 51.5% of the respondents
believe that Social Security benefits would be reduced if Joe earned $20,000 in his 63rd year,
quite a bit above the actual threshold of $14,640 in 2012. Almost half (48.5%) believed that
Joe’s benefits would be unchanged or would increase right away. For those who knew that
benefits would be reduced, 70% stated that Joe could have kept his benefit if he earned less than
a threshold (which they thought would be $11,500 per year on average, below the actual
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threshold). Among those who thought that benefits would be unchanged for $20,000 in annual
earnings, the average threshold amount stated was $25,700, almost double the actual value in
2012. In other words, among the US population as a whole, most people do not understand that
there is an earnings test. Those who do overestimate the amount they can earn before losing
benefits.
Table 3 here
We also see from Table 3 that very few understand the additional benefits gleaned from
work after early claiming. About half the respondents (54%) believed that Joe’s benefits would
not change after he quit working, and only 40% understood that his benefits would rise after the
Full Retirement age due to the increased work.

Evidently, the rules in effect since 2009

providing for actuarially neutral benefit recomputations are not widely understood by the average
individual in the US population.
Using the answers to the Joe questions, we next group respondents into “knowledge
clusters.” At one end of the spectrum we have the fully informed subset, and at the other, the
completely uninformed group. We assign respondents to one of three categories: “No
knowledge”, “Some knowledge” and “Fully informed,” as in Table 4. The approach used for
Cluster A counts as fully informed any respondent who knows that Joe’s benefits will be cut due
to additional work, along with those who know there is a threshold but think it is higher than it
actually is (Group 3). For Cluster B, those who overstate the threshold are not classified as
having some knowledge but not fully informed. Results from ordered Probit analyses appear in
Table 5, where the dependent variable indicates to which of the three groups a respondent
belongs, with higher-value categories indicating more knowledge.
Tables 4 and 5 here
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Results from the two different knowledge groupings are qualitatively similar. Not
surprisingly, respondent knowledge of the ET rules rises with age and education. In other words,
older respondents, who are closer to retirement age, have more reason to familiarize themselves
with the rules and indeed they do. We have also found in other contexts (Brown, Kapteyn, and
Mitchell 2011) that being better educated is correlated with a better understanding of Social
Security rules. Knowledge is related to benefit levels (PIA is the Primary Insurance Amount,
which is in turn a function of lifetime earnings) in a non-linear manner, first falling and then
rising with PIA. Higher permanent earnings are associated with slightly lower knowledge,
somewhat surprisingly (the PIA refers to the individual’s Primary Insurance Amount which is
SSA’s approach to measuring lifetime earnings). Men and women are equally well (or poorly)
informed, as the coefficient is not statistically significant.

4. Results for Frames
Table 6 presents descriptive statistics of the responses to the various earnings test frames
on four different outcome variables of interest over the age 62-FRA window: average annual
earnings, average annual earnings in excess of the threshold, the percent of earnings over the
threshold, and the average claim age. Our predominant impression from the results is that the
differences in outcomes across the frames are very minor, certainly compared to standard
deviations. The bottom part of the Table summarizes change induced by the various frames
compared to the baseline. The biggest earnings changes are for Frames 4 and 5. Claim ages vary
so little that the differences only amount to a couple of days. For Frames 1 and 4 (annuity only)
we observe an increase in earnings, while the frames showing both earnings and a lump sum (3
and 5) appear to induce a reduction in earnings.
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Table 6 here
Table 7 presents paired t-tests of the null hypothesis that the frames do not prompt any
changes in earnings or claim age outcomes. To increase power, we now combine the frames that
are identical except for the interest rate assumption. For most of the frames, we fail to reject the
null: that is, there is no significant reaction to the different ways of explaining the Earnings Test.
It is worth briefly discussing the few cases where the null is rejected. First, after we tell
respondents that the ET is a tax, it is surprising that the percentage of total earnings subject to the
threshold rises significantly. This appears to be an odd response to a tax increase at first sight,
but we note that that total earnings actually fall slightly and so do average annual earnings over
the threshold.
Table 7 here
In a number of frames, the claim age increases slightly (and significantly) after the frame
treatment. It is unclear a priori how claim ages should respond to more knowledge about the
earnings test, except when respondents believe the earnings test to be a tax. More information
might induce them to claim later to avoid paying the tax. Yet in the only frame where
respondents are told the earnings test is a tax, respondents actually claim earlier (.09 year, i.e.
about a month). Comparing the frame where respondents are told to assume that ET is not a tax
to all frames combined shows a small and marginally significant effect on average annual
earnings. Earnings are a bit higher on average in the various frames than when assuming there is
no tax. Given that so few of the differences are statistically significant, the ones that are may
very well be the result of chance.
Our overall impression, in sum, is that the alternative frames have little if any impact on
respondents’ earnings and claim ages. This outcome is consistent with a story where respondents
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have a very hard time understanding the Earnings Test and hence also find it difficult to evaluate
the various frames.

5. Multivariate Analysis
To examine the results in more detail, we next run OLS regressions linking our four
outcome variables of interest to dummies representing the frames (the frame showing annuities
only is the reference category), quadratics in the PIA and age, and education dummies. The four
dependent variables are average annual earnings from age 62-FRA, average annual earnings over
the threshold reported by the respondent, the percent of total earnings over the true threshold,
and claim age. Since the differences between frames using distinct interest rate assumptions are
minor, we combine those frames to increase the number of observations per cell. Results appear
in Table 8.
Table 8 here
Coefficient estimates in the frames are generally statistically insignificant. In fact, there
are only three significant effects among eight coefficients, which is just a bit better than chance.
Moreover, since the average annual earnings variables are transformations of one another, it is
unclear what the significance levels mean. For instance, the percent of total earnings subject to
the true threshold between 62 and FRA is never significant, but the average annual earnings
greater than the threshold are positively affected when we show respondents the lump sum (and
not when we show both lump sum and annuity). Also, total average annual earnings between 62
and FRA are not affected when we only show lump sum and negatively when we show annuity
and lump sum. We summarize our results as follows:
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Summary of Results from Multivariate Framing Regressions
Combination frames
Av. Annual Earnings Age 62 - FRA
Av. Annual Earnings > Threshhold 62 FRA
% Total Earnings s.t. True Threshold 62 AFRA
Claim Age

1:
Annuity
Omitted

2: LS
NS

3: Annuity & LS
NS

Omitted

NS

NS

Omitted

NS

NS

Omitted

NS

Sig, -

6. Discussion and Conclusions
A large majority of older Americans relies on Social Security benefits for all or most of
their retirement income. Nevertheless, a recent study (Moore, 2011, np) noted that “most retirees
…pass up opportunities for additional lifetime retirement income. Taking Social Security
benefits when they turned 62, many retirees born in 1943, for example, passed up increases of at
least 33% in their monthly inflation-adjusted Social Security benefit levels available at full
retirement age of 66.” One reason may be that older individuals have a very difficult time
understanding the key features of life annuities which provide income streams for life (Brown,
Kapteyn, and Mitchell 2012; Brown, Kapteyn, Luttmer, and Mitchell 2012).
Moreover, retirees face an additional set of opportunities and constraints imposed by the
Social Security Earnings Test and subsequent benefit increases that afford older workers an
opportunity to work even after claiming benefits. Our research using the ALP, a nationally
representative internet survey, confirms that many Americans have an inkling that working and
earning income after claiming Social Security benefits results in lower benefits. Nevertheless,
very few older persons and even fewer younger workers are aware that the benefit offset is
“made up” in the form of higher benefits later, after the Full Retirement Age. Our work shows
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that this shortfall in perception is widespread and not easily addressed by alternative ways of
presenting the information. We find very few significant effects of the frames on earnings or
claim age, and the few significant effects are difficult to interpret.
An interesting puzzle emerges from our findings, namely why do so many empirical
studies report that legislated changes in the Social Security Earnings Test seem to have a
measurable impact on older workers’ labor supply behavior? One reason may be that, for the
first 75 years of the Social Security program’s existence, the Test was indeed a tax – it was not
until 2009 that the Delayed Retirement Credit grew sufficiently large that it became effectively
actuarially fair. We have documented that only about 40% of the respondents in our sample
believe that the benefit reduction before the FRA leads to higher benefits later. Additionally,
many financial advisers think of the Earnings Test as a tax and therefore fail to tell their clients
that benefit reductions before FRA are given back later in the form of higher benefit streams for
life.
One conclusion of our work is that knowledge of the mechanics of the earnings test is
very limited. In particular, the actuarial adjustment of benefits after the FRA is largely not
understood by the American workforce. Yet our efforts to find informational frames that can
help individuals make more informed decisions have proved disappointing. The measured effects
of the alternative frames are generally small and sometimes counter-intuitive. This may, of
course, indicate that our frames were too complex for most individuals to grasp. It also suggests
that, short of changing the Earnings Test itself, there are grounds for improving the general
information provided about the mechanics of the Earnings Test.
There are potentially interesting policy implications from our work. For instance it might
be useful to build up middle-aged and older workers’ knowledge of the Earnings Test, and to
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explain more clearly that it is, in fact, no longer a tax. To this end, Gruber and Orzag (1999)
recommended “(a) clear and concise mailing to all 61 year olds in America about how the
earnings test really works, with simple examples, would remove a substantial amount of the
misinformation about the functioning of the system. Similarly, beneficiaries whose benefits are
reduced because of the earnings test should be told how much their subsequent benefits will be
increased as a result.” Financial advisers and SSA field agents might also benefit from updated
information about how the Earnings Test works today. And finally, Biggs (2008) has pointed out
that educating the news media could be beneficial, since inaccurate depictions of the rewards to
continued work could have a substantial impact on workers’ interest in and incentives to remain
employed at older ages.
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Table 1. Key Changes in Earnings Test and Social Security Benefit Recomputation Rules
Year Change
1935 Entire monthly benefit withdrawn for any work (earnings test threshold of zero).
1939 Beneficiaries allowed to earn up to $14.99/ month without a reduction in benefit; above
that threshold, entire amount withdrawn; thresholds raised over time to 1960 with
somewhat higher earnings permitted those age 75+ (from 1950) and age 72+ (from
1954).
1960 Benefit reduction rate of $1 per $2 of earnings above $1,200 a year but below $1,500
threshold per year ($1 per $1 of earnings above that, i.e. benefit reduction rate of
100%).Lower and upper thresholds raised over time thereafter.
1972 Benefit reduction rate $1 per $2 of earnings for earnings above threshold of $2,100 and
threshold raised in steps thereafter to $3,000 by 1976 (i.e., removal of 100 percent benefit
reduction rate above higher threshold).
1972 Delayed Retirement Credit (DRC) of 1%/year introduced, raising benefits for workers
who delay retirement past the Full Retirement Age (FRA).
1977 Lower earnings test threshold implemented for those age 62–64 than for those 65+.
Thresholds raised periodically after that.
1977 DRC raised to 3% per year gradually increasing to 8% per year (from 2009).
1983 Beneficiaries age 70+ exempted from the earnings test. Benefit reduction rate $1 per $3
of earnings above the threshold for those at or above the FRA.
2000 Beneficiaries at or above FRA exempted from the earnings test. Younger persons face
benefit reductions of $1 for each $2 if younger than the FRA; earnings test eliminated for
those over FRA.
Source:
Authors’ adaptation from DeWitt (1999) and SSA (2012a)
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Table 2: Sample Size Adjustments In ALP
Initial N
Special cases
Pilot observations dropped
Did not finish survey
Respondent with $400 billion income
Ineligible for SS benefits
Disability (present or future)
Other reason (not eligible earnings, not US
resident, etc)
Did not answer SS eligibility question
Dropped from experiments
Did not answer baseline earnings question even
though eligible (et10)
Age >= 62 (dropped from conjectural questions
incl. et19 and et20)
Initial claimage over FRA (dropped from
conjectural questions incl. et19 and et20)
No FRA recorded
Skipped vignette (knowledege) questions
Problems with PIA estimate
No PIA estimate
Sample for frame analyses

3772
86
46
1
278
165
6

71
808
897
3
17
300
1094
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Table 3. Responses to Joe Vignette
12. Now, suppose that on his 63rd birthday, Joe goes back to work part‐time and earns $20,000. While he
is working that year, what do you think would happen to his Social Security benefits for that year?

N

Decreased
Unchanged
Increased

%

1,852

51.5

1,427

39.68

317

8.82

N

%

IF 12 Decreased: Is there any amount he could earn without losing his benefits?

Yes
No

1,309

69.93

563

30.07

Mean

SD

11,490

8,126

If 13 Yes: What is the threshold?

Average amount

15. IF 12 Unchanged: Is there any amount he could earn that would cause him to lose his benefits?

Yes
No

N

%

895

61.39

563

38.61

If 15 Yes: What is the threshold?

Average amount

Mean

SD

25,735

22,571

ET17: Now let’s imagine that at the end of that year, right before his 64th birthday, Joe stops working again
and never again returns to work.Let’s consider what happens to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 64,
right after he stopped working permanently, as a result of the fact that he went back to work for one year
while he was age 63.

Decreased
Unchanged
Increased

N

%

9.06

9.06

1,917

53.25

1,357

37.69

ET18. Now let’s consider what would happen to Joe’s Social Security benefits at age 68, several years after
he stopped working permanently. What do you believe would happen to Joe’s benefits as a result of the
fact that he went back to work for a single year while he was age 63.

Decreased
Unchanged
Increased

N

%

217

6.01

1,961

54.28

1,435

39.72

ET19. would grow to more than $1,000 at age 64 and also at age 68. We would now like to know how you
think the Social Security benefit paid while he is age 68 compares to what he received at age 65. Based on
what we have told you (and remembering that we are assuming there is no inflation and no cost‐of‐living
increases), do you think that the Social Security benefit he is paid while age 68 would be:

Less than
Same
Greater than

N

%

23

2.56

500

55.74

374

41.69
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Table 4: Clustering of Respondents by Knowledge of Earnings Test Rules
All groups
No knowledge

Clustering A
No ET knowledge

Group 3
Group 4

No change for Joe but
there is a threshold
No change for Joe but
there is a threshold and it
is known
Increase for Joe

Group 5

Group 1

Group 2

Number
567

Percent
16%

ET knowledge,
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge

623

17%

ET knowledge,
known threshold
No ET knowledge

Some ET knowledge
No ET knowledge

237
317

7%
9%

Decrease for Joe (correct), ET knowledge,
unknown threshold
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge

584

16%

510

14%

391

11%

367

10%

Group 7

Decrease for Joe (correct),
known threshold
Decrease for Joe (correct),
not a tax, unknown
threshold

Group 8

Fully Informed

Group 6

Total RED
Total YELLOW
Total GREEN
Percent RED
Percent YELLOW
Percent GREEN

ET knowledge,
known threshold

Clustering B
No ET knowledge

Some ET knowledge

ET knoweldge,
unknown threshold Some ET knowledge
ET knowledge,
known threshold Fully Informed
884
1598
1114

884
2345
367

24.6%
44.4%
31.0%

24.6%
65.2%
10.2%
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Table 5: Ordered Probits: Coefficients in bold if significant at least at p<.1
Knowledge Cluster A
PIA
Age
Education (<HS grad
ref)

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>z

PIA

-0.0007

0.0003

0.02

PIA squared

0.0000

0.0000

0.00

Age

0.0383

0.0189

0.04

Age squared

-0.0002

0.0002

0.28

Education HS grad

0.1466

0.1328

0.27

Education College grad

0.2276

0.1364

0.10

0.0428

0.0494

0.39

Female (= 1)

2279
119.78
0
0.02
-2369.93

N*
LR chi2(7)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood

Knowledge Cluster B
PIA
Age
Education (<HS grad
ref)

Coef.

Std. Err.

P>z

PIA

-0.0009

0.0003

0.00

PIA squared

0.0000

0.0000

0.00

Age

0.0423

0.0197

0.03

Age squared

-0.0003

0.0002

0.20

Education HS grad

0.2142

0.1406

0.13

Education College grad

0.2608

0.1442

0.07

0.0147

0.0518

0.78

Female (= 1)
N*
LR chi2(7)
Prob > chi2
Pseudo R2
Log likelihood

2279
90.69
0
0.02
-1873.93

Note: Knowledge Clusters A and B defined in text.
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Table 6. Description of Outcomes by Frame
Average annual
earnings

Average annual
earnings > threshold

% earnings 62‐
FRA s.t. ET (true
threshold)
Mean

SD

Claimage

Mean

SD

Frame contents
Amount 1
Amount 2

Frame

Mean

SD

Mean

SD

Frame 0: No
information,
not a tax

$ 27,229

$ 72,464

$ 20,136

$ 70,497

4.8%

0.13388

65.117

2.12569

N
1,034

Frame 1:
Annuity

$ 27,861

$ 66,922

$ 20,784

$ 65,036

4.8%

0.152884

65.1123

2.35715

228

Frame 2:
Lump Sum
(Adjust to
make equal)

$ 29,448

$ 46,526

$ 21,972

$ 43,150

4.4%

0.116872

65.3737

2.15041

217

Frame 3:
Annuity &
Lump sum
(Adjust on
LS)

$ 24,742

$ 43,241

$ 17,661

$ 40,105

5.2%

0.142385

64.9888

2.0403

293

The "earnings test" we just
described is applied to earnings
before age. It is important to
note, however, that these
benefit reductions are not truly
lost. Your Social Security benefit
is increased to make up for
benefits withheld due to earlier
earnings.
Annuity:
Annuity:
Income
Incremental
taken away
monthly income
each month you will get
starting at age
67
Lump sum:
Lump sum: Say
PV of that
it's the same as
amount
Amount 1 (cheat
being taken
to make this
away using
consistent with
the actual
messaging about
trustee
actuarial
assumptions fairness)
Show both
Show both
monthly
monthly and
and lump
lump sum
sum
amounts from 1
amounts
and 2
from 1 and
2
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Average annual
earnings

Average annual
earnings > threshold

Mean

SD

Mean

$ 34,160

$ 126,320

$ 26,196

########

4.2%

0.132401

65.4183

2.12471

209

Annuity:
Monthly
amount 1
from Frame
1

Frame 5:
Annuity &
Lump sum
(both
amounts
adjusted)

$ 20,771

$ 31,877

$ 14,246

$ 28,195

4.5%

0.119939

64.891

2.2087

211

Monthly
and LS
amounts
from 1' and
2

‐
0.00%
0.000 ‐0.35%
(0.000) 0.42%
0.000 ‐0.61%
(0.000) ‐0.27%

‐
(0.019)
0.017
(0.029)
(0.014)

‐
0.261
(0.124)
0.306
(0.221)

‐
0.005
(0.002)
0.006
(0.004)

$
‐
$ 1,188
$ (3,123)
$ 5,412
$ (6,538)

SD

Mean

SD

Frame contents
Amount 1
Amount 2

Frame 4:
Annuity only
(second
amount is
adjusted)

‐
0.000
(0.000)
0.000
(0.000)

Mean

Claimage

Frame

Differences: F0 to Frame X
Frame 1
$
‐
Frame 2
$ 1,586
Frame 3
$ (3,119)
Frame 4
$ 6,299
Frame 5
$ (7,090)

SD

% earnings 62‐
FRA s.t. ET (true
threshold)

N

Annuity: Use the
lump sum
amount 2 from
Frame 2, go back
and change the
monthly income
amount 2 so
monthly amount
is same
Monthly and LS
amounts from 1'
and 2
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Table 7. Changes in Earnings and Claim Age by Frame
ET20 (assume it is a tax) vs F0 (assume not a tax)

a, b

ET20
F0
p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA
$
27,162 $ 27,190
0.1703
Average Annual Earnings > Threshold between 62 and FRA
$
19,817 $ 19,832
0.3203
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA
6.85%
4.81%
0.0008
Claim Age
64.58
64.67
0.0001
a.
note that there are a different number of people in F0 eligible for this test than in the frames comparisons, as it is
paired and we had fewer respondents to ET20 than F0. Tthe F0 numbers are thus slightly different here than in the
next test.
b
also note that for all of these, the standard errors for age of claiming is very low since they only have a few
options
F0 (assume not a tax) vs all frames (information)

a, b

F0
Frames
p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA
$
27,454 $ 27,661
0.0149
Average Annual Earnings > Threshold between 62 and FRA
$
20,293 $ 20,433
0.0545
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA
4.78%
4.74%
0.7785
Claim Age
65.11
65.17
0.0016
a
note that there is a different number of people in F0 eligible for this test, as it is paired and we had fewer
respondents to ET20 than F0
b

also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options

F0 (assume not a tax) vs annuity frames

a, b

Frames
p(diff)
F0
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA
$
31,051 $ 31,174
0.1771
Average Annual Earnings > Threshold between 62 and FRA
$
23,686 $ 23,766
0.2359
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA
4.45%
4.52%
0.7688
Claim Age
65.22
65.27
0.1284
a
there are a couple of outliers in frame 4 accounting for the much higher average earnings
b
also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
F0 (assume not a tax) vs lump sum frames

a

F0
Frames
p(diff)
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA
$
29,682 $ 30,041
0.0963
Average Annual Earnings > Threshold between 62 and FRA
$
22,343 $ 22,508
0.2412
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA
4.58%
4.56%
0.9701
Claim Age
65.26
65.39
0.0174
a
also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
F0 (assume not a tax) to lump sum + annuity frames

a

Frames
p(diff)
F0
Average Annual Earnings: 62 to FRA
$
22,614 $ 22,835
0.1745
Average Annual Earnings > Threshold between 62 and FRA
$
15,753 $ 15,945
0.2412
% Total Earnings s.t. True ET Threshold 62 and FRA
5.23%
5.04%
0.4507
Claim Age
64.92
64.95
0.0908
a
also note that for all of these, the standard errors for claim age are very low since they only have a few options
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Table 8. Sensitivity of of Earnings and Claim Age Outcomes to Frames (OLS)
Bold coefficients are significant at least p<.1
A. Av. Annual earnings 62 to FRA
Frames

Controls

Coef.
Std. Err.
Combo Frame 1 Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only -1423.95 5917.52
(Annuity only
ref)
Combo Frame 3: Both
-8910.99 4851.71
PIA
PIA
26.30
-44.07
PIA squared
Age

Age

t
-0.24
-1.84
-1.68

0.01

2.22

1653.86 2332.17

0.71

0.02

Age squared
Education (<HS
Education HS grad
ref)
Education College grad

17834.96 11770.12

1.52

Female

-6153.57 4596.90

-1.34

21975.65 53674.61

0.41

Constant
Number of obs

-25.09

25.71

-0.98

7426.90 11378.41

0.65

1070

F( 10, 602)

3.69

Prob > F

0.0001

R-squared

0.0304

Adj R-squared

0.0221

Root MSE

70645

B. Av. Annual earnings > Threshhold 62 to FRA
Frames

Controls

Coef.
Std. Err.
Combo Frame 1 Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only -1382.87 5759.29
(Annuity only
ref)
Combo Frame 3: Both
-8206.37 4721.98
PIA
PIA
25.59
-44.43
PIA squared
Age

Age
Age squared

Censored obs
Uncensored obs

0.01

1502.46 2269.81
-23.02

-0.24

-1.74
-1.74
2.28
0.66

25.03

-0.92

4804.65 11074.16

0.43

Education (<HS Education HS grad
ref)
Education College grad

14080.95 11455.40

1.23

Female

-5834.62 4473.98

-1.30

20040.93 52239.40

0.38

Constant
Number of obs

0.02

t

1070
3.43
0.0004
0.0283

Wald chi2(9)

0.0201

Prob > chi2

68756

36

Table 8 (cont)
C. % Total Earnings st True ET Threshold 62 to FRA
Coef.
Frames
Controls

Combo Frame 1 Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only
(Annuity only Combo Frame 3: Both
f)
PIA
PIA
Age

0.00

Std. Err.
0.01

t
0.06

0.00

0.01

0.27

0.00

0.00

1.07

PIA squared

0.00

0.00

-0.56

Age

0.00

0.00

-0.37

Age squared
Education (<HS Education HS grad
ref)
Education College grad

0.00

0.00

0.22

-0.04

0.02

-1.97

-0.03

0.02

-1.19

Female

-0.01

0.01

-0.60

0.08

0.10

0.80

Constant
Number of obs

1070

F( 10, 602)

1.87

Prob > F

0.0531

R-squared

0.0156

Adj R-squared

0.0073

Root MSE

0.13362

D. Claim Age
Coef.
Frames
Controls

Combo Frame 1 Combo Frame 2: Lump sum only
(Annuity only Combo Frame 3: Both
f)
PIA
PIA

t

0.12

0.15

0.81

-0.25

0.13

-1.97

0.00

0.00

0.66

PIA squared

0.00

0.00

-1.04

Age

0.26

0.06

4.33

Age squared
Education (<HS Education HS grad
ref)
Education College grad

0.00

0.00

-4.89

0.53

0.30

1.76

0.79

0.31

2.55

Female

0.09

0.12

0.73

59.82

1.34

44.58

Age

Constant
Number of obs

1458

F( 10, 602)

10.59

Prob > F

Std. Err.

0

R-squared

0.0618

Adj R-squared

0.0559

Root MSE

2.1246
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Figure 1. Joe Vignette
A. Background on Joe

B. Joe Returns to Work at Age 63
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C. Knowledge of ET Threshold

D. Joe Stops Working Again

39

E. Knowledge of Benefit Recomputation
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Figure 2. Own Expectations
A. Assume no Earnings Test

B. Assume 50% Earnings Test
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Figure 3. Assume Full Benefit Recomputation (Frame 0 )
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Figure 4. Annuity Only (Frame 1 )
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Figure 5. Actuarially Fair Lump Sum (Frame 2)

44

Figure 6. Actuarially Fair Lump Sum and Annuity (Frame 3)

